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Abstract—Some of the main challenges towards utiliz-
ing conventional cryptographic techniques in Internet of
Things (IoT) include the need for generating secret keys
for such a large-scale network, distributing the gener-
ated keys to all the devices, key storage as well as the
vulnerability to security attacks when an adversary gets
physical access to the devices. In this paper, a novel
secret key generation method is proposed for IoTs that
utilize the intrinsic randomness embedded in the devices’
memories introduced in the manufacturing process. A
fuzzy extractor structure using serially concatenated BCH-
Polar codes is proposed to generate reproducible keys
from a ReRAM-based ternary-state Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) for device authentication and secret key
generation. The main concern in deploying PUF-based key
generation methods is the leakage of information about
the secret keys from the publicly available helper data.
The fuzzy extractor proposed in this paper ensures much
less mutual information between the generated keys and
the helper data. The experimental results show that our
proposed scheme is capable of generating notably stronger
keys compared to existing techniques, while utilizing a
significantly lower number of helper data bits. The failure
probability when a low complex Successive Cancellation
decoder is implemented in the proposed fuzzy extractor
structure is 10−8 which was further increased to 10−10
when a complex iterative belief propagation decoder was
used.1
Index Terms- Strong cryptographic key, Fuzzy Extrac-
tor, ReRAM, PUFs, Polar Codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) has led
to a technology breakthrough, but it comes with a set
of new challenges including security, radio spectrum
scarcity, complexity of network, and data management.
IoT nodes are prone to selfish and malicious attacks.
The selfish attacks can be reduced by using a reputa-
tion based model in a property rights spectrum sharing
model using coalition formation techniques [1]. Once
spectrum is allocated to the IoT nodes, we have to
ensure that the the information is sent to, or received
from an authenticated user. Authentication is currently
based on key-based cryptographic mechanisms that heav-
ily rely on uniformly distributed, robust, reliable, and
reproducible secret keys which are stored in the non-
volatile memory (NVM) of the device [2]. However,
these NVMs are highly vulnerable to physical attacks
due to their robust electrical nature and maintaining the
secrecy and integrity of these keys is a strenuous task,
1This project is partially supported by Arizona Board of Regents
under Grant # 1003330.
particularly in large-scale heterogeneous IoTs. Protection
against physical attacks often involves the use of active
tamper detection and prevention circuitry that requires a
constant power supply [3]. Therefore, these approaches
are expensive from both design area and power consump-
tion perspectives. Hardware-based security mechanisms
using Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), utilize the
intrinsic variations introduced during the fabrication pro-
cess which include the doping level of semi-conducting
layers, threshold voltages, and critical dimensions, etc.,
to extract a “fingerprint” of the device. This can be used
for identification and authentication of the device and
will allow us to eliminate the need to store the secret
keys in the NVM of the devices [4]–[6].
PUF-based security mechanisms rely on building unique
challenge and response pairs (CRPs) for each device
that can be reproduced in different conditions. Strong
PUFs are expected to offer a high enough inter Hamming
distance (distance between responses of two different
PUFs under same conditions) which makes each device
unique from the other ones, while having a low intra
Hamming distance (distance between two responses of
a single PUF under same conditions) to reduce the
amount of False Acceptance Rate (FAR) [7]. However,
the responses of PUFs are subject to variations due to
temperature changes, aging, drifts, electro-magnetic in-
teractions, and other sources of noise. To deal with such
variations in the PUFs’ responses in different physical
conditions, several fuzzy extractors which use strong
error correction coding (ECC) techniques have been
proposed [8]–[13]. These conventional ECC schemes can
provide an acceptable error correction capability where
the PUFs are utilized for authentication purposes, since
true authentication can be granted if the rate of matching
responses is below a certain threshold [14]. However,
these current ECC schemes deem insufficient when the
PUFs are utilized for generating cryptographic keys,
where even a single bit mismatch between the private
keys generated from PUF responses in different condi-
tions can invalidate the performance of the symmetrical
encryption schemes such as Data Encryption Standard
(DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
The contribution of this paper is to propose a novel
key generation method using ternary state ReRAM-
based PUFs to generate reproducible and reliable keys
using less publicly available Helper Data. Here, we
propose a syndrome-based fuzzy extractor using serially
concatenated BCH-Polar codes that can offer several
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unique advantages compared to current technologies:
• Uses polar codes which can significantly reduce
the mutual information between the generated key
and the publicly available helper data compared to
other schemes, and hence reduce the capability of
attackers to reconstruct the key by using the helper
data.
• Using serially concatenated BCH -Polar codes can
exactly regenerate the key using helper data which
is highly demanded in PUF-based key generation
applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, a brief review of the state of the art PUF technolo-
gies, fuzzy extractor schemes and importance of using
Polar codes in Fuzzy extractors is provided. In Section
III, the proposed fuzzy extractor scheme using serially
concatenated BCH-Polar Codes is provided. Section IV
discusses the experimental results and the performance
of the proposed method.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Memory-based PUFs
Memory-based PUFs use the memory present in a
chip/device to extract a fingerprint and therefore, they
can be implemented in simple IoT devices with little
or no extra parts added, to allow authentication in a
network. Several memory technologies have been de-
ployed to build PUFs. SRAM-based PUF uses CMOS
architecture and can be easily integrated in a system,
but they give off energy while switching states that can
be detected using a signal analyzer. Therefore, this type
of PUF gives the hackers enough information to clone
the device and extract the key [15], [16].
New IoT technologies often utilize more advanced mem-
ory devices such as Resistive Random Access Memory
(ReRAM), memristive devices, and MRAM. Memristor
and ReRAM rely on resistive technology to store in-
formation, where the current or the resistance of the
cell when a biased voltage is applied can be used
as a challenge [17], [18]. These devices have high
randomness which not only occur in separate dies but
also in the same die. Therefore, they can be a good
candidate for a PUF. ReRAM based PUFs are faster
when compared to MRAM or Flash and operate at
or below noise level making them more resistant to
side channel attacks without direct access to the chip.
Operating power of ReRAM is around 10pJ/bit which is
much lower compared to 1mJ/bit for Flash and 100pJ/bit
for MRAM.
While the accessibility, easy process of challenge and
response generation, and operation at or below noise
level in ReRAMs are of great interest to generate
ideal PUFs, these memory devices are highly sensitive
to the physical conditions (e.g. temperature, operating
current, and electromagnetic interference) of the test
environment. Besides such environmental circumstances,
other factors including aging of the device and random
noise sources can result in flipping of the programmed
bits one way or other during the response generation.
This in turn increases the probability of false negative
authentication (FNA) when a single device is being
authenticated in different conditions. Such errors can
be partially corrected using ECC and fuzzy extractor
schemes to allow the use of memory-based PUFs for
authentication purposes. However, in key generation
applications where the extracted key is used to encrypt
the messages of a user, even a single bit error does not
allow the decryption of the message. Thus limiting the
applications of memory-based PUFs as cryptographic
primitives [19]. A new concept of ternary PUFs was
proposed in [16] to enhance the reliability of PUFs’
responses by identifying three possible states of “0”, “1”
and “X” for each cell rather than a conventional binary
assignment. In the proposed ternary PUFs, the cells that
are too close to the threshold and are not reliable are
blanked by an “X”. This will allow reduction in CRP
error compared to a binary scenario but, the CRP error
is still not equal to 0. Here we utilize these ternary
ReRAM-based PUFs to propose a practical solution for
key generation described in Section III to allow exact
reproduction of the key.
B. Fuzzy Extractors
Fuzzy extractors were proposed in [2] to convert
noisy non-uniform PUF data into reproducible uniform
strings. Fuzzy extractors can extract a uniformly random
string S and a non-secret helper data string P from its
original input W . This P will allow exact reproduction
of the string S from noisy input data W ′ which remains
close to W . A review of several constructions for fuzzy
extractors are provided in [2]. Fuzzy extractor structures
are based on utilizing different ECC techniques, among
which BCH codes have been widely utilized [2], [8],
[9], [11]–[13]. Two constructions for fuzzy extractors
namely: code offset and syndrome-based constructions
were proposed in [2]. In code-offset construction; helper
data is generated by XORing the PUF input and the
respective ECC codeword of the PUF input, while in the
syndrome-based construction; helper data is generated
by multiplying the PUF data with a parity matrix.
Our proposed fuzzy extractor follows the syndrome-
based construction, but can be extended to a code-offset
construction by masking the PUF data using the ECC
codewords.
C. Polar Codes
Polar codes are linear block ECCs whose construction
is based on multiple recursive concatenation of short
kernel codes which transforms the physical channel in
to virtual outer channels whose capacity is either 0 or
1 [20]. The channels whose capacity is 1 are called
unfrozen channels and they are used to sent information.
These bits through which information is sent are called
unfrozen bits. The channels whose capacity is 0 are
called unfrozen channels and usually a 0 is sent through
these channels. These bits through which no information
is sent are called frozen bits.
The position where the unfrozen and frozen bits appear
during channel polarization is dependent on the Bhat-
tacharya parameter (measure of reliability) which is a
function of the channels design parameters. Noting the
Fig. 1: Block diagram of the proposed key generation scheme for Key registration and Regeneration.
considerable error correction capability of polar codes
and more importantly, the low (almost zero) mutual
information between the frozen and unfrozen bits in
such codes, they can be utilized in combination with
fuzzy extractors for key generation purposes. In [10],
a fuzzy extractor structure only based on Polar codes
for binary SRAM PUF was proposed in which the key
was generated using unfrozen bits of polar codes and
the frozen bits were used as the helper data. This paper
utilized a computationally complex successive cancella-
tion decoder called Hash Aided SC List decoder (HA-
SCL) to achieve a failure probability of 10−9 but utilized
896 bits to regenerate a 128 bit key. Thus utilizing data
almost 7 times the size of the key for key regeneration.
III. PROPOSED KEY GENERATION SCHEME FOR
TERNARY RERAM-BASED PUFS
Here, we propose a secret key generation scheme
using ternary ReRAM-based PUFs, to generate unique
keys from noisy PUFs’ data by using less helper data
compared to previously proposed schemes. A fuzzy
extractor using a serial concatenation of BCH and polar
codes is designed to generate the Secret Key and Helper
Data. Using polar codes in the proposed scheme results
in reducing the level of mutual information between the
generated secret key and the publicly made available
helper data, since there is almost zero mutual information
between the frozen bits and unfrozen bits [10]. Our
proposed serially concatenated BCH-Polar model re-
quires a lower number of helper data bits while offering
a comparable failure probability compared to common
fuzzy extractor schemes proposed in the literature as
shown in the Table I. This is possible as the BCH
encoder also helps correct a few bits of the noisy PUF
data, thus increasing the coding efficiency while having
a low complexity.
The stable 0’s and 1’s are obtained from the ReRAM
PUF data, by first dividing the ReRAM PUF data into
three states “0”, “1”, and “X” and then discarding the
memory cells which are prone to flip due to slight
variations in environment (X) [21]. This will essentially
extract a stable binary PUF from the ternary PUF which
can be used to generate strong, reliable and reproducible
cryptographic keys [22].
A. Registration
In the Registration phase, the ReRAM PUF data is
encoded using a BCH encoder to increase the coding
gain and allow reconstruction of the PUF responses with
minimum error and less helper data. The BCH encoded
output is then sent to a polar encoder whose output is
unique for every input UN = XNBCHG
N , where UN is
the polar encoded output, XNBCH is the BCH encoded
PUF data, and GN is the generator. The bits that occur
in the non-frozen positions at the output of the polar
encoder are hashed and stored in the server as a secret
key, SK and the helper data, PN−K is obtained from
the frozen bit positions of the polar encoded data. Helper
data and secret key can be represented by the equations
below,
PN−K ∼= XNBCHGNF = CN [F ] (1)
SK ∼= XNBCHGNFC = CN [FC ] (2)
Fig. 2: Distribution of various Re-RAM Cells
where F represents the frozen bit indices and FC
represents the non-frozen bit indices. As the cells are
assigned 0’s and 1’s based on their individual resistances,
the cells are independent of each others behavior. An
example of a Polar Encoder used in Key Generation
scheme with {1,2,3,4,6} frozen bits representing five
Helper Data bits made publicly available to regenerate
the three bit key using Noisy PUF data is shown in Fig.
3. In this figure, xi represents the BCH encoded PUF
bits and ci represents the polar encoded output of xi.
B. Key Regeneration
During Key Regeneration phase, a polar decoder and
BCH decoder are utilized to observe the output of
the BCH-Polar encoded noisy PUF along with publicly
available Helper Data. The Helper data is combined
with the BCH-Polar encoded noisy PUF by simply
substituting the frozen bits of the noisy encoded data
with the helper data bits. The Polar and BCH decoder
utilizes this combined data to get a close estimate of
the initial ReRAM PUF input. When a low complex SC
decoder is utilized as a Polar decoder, its performance
is not good enough for short block lengths, hence it can
be further improved using SC list decoder, or a Belief
propagation decoder. Fig. 1 summarizes the construction
of Key and Helper data using ReRAM PUF data.
IV. RESULTS
In this study, we use the samples from a ReRAM PUF
fabricated at Northern Arizona University’s CyberSecu-
rity laboratory. This PUF comprises of a HfO2 active
solid electrolyte chalcogenide with a Hafnium based
top electrode, and a tungsten based bottom electrode.
The measured parameters from each cell include: i)
stepping the voltage in the positive voltage direction at
constant compliance current to measure the programing
voltage, Vset; ii) after programming, measurement of
the low resistive states Ron. The measurements from
254 fabricated ReRAM cells are available, where each
measurement was repeated 102 times. After analyzing
the data, the measurements of Ron were used to generate
the CRPs as it offers the desired performance metrics:
i) the measurement of each cell is independent and is
normally distributed, and ii) the readings of resistance
for different cells are also independent and normally
Fig. 3: Polar Encoder to select Key and Helper Data
from BCH encoded ReRAM PUF.
distributed. Fig. 2 shows the independency and normal
distribution of the Ron measurements for two randomly
selected cells.
In order to determine the optimum threshold values to
classify the cell responses to ‘0’, ‘1’, and ‘X’, the distri-
bution of all the 254 cells is plotted, and then range of
the response distribution is divided into three equal parts
using two thresholds, Threshold1 and Threshold2. The
cells whose resistance is below Threshold1 (lies in
the left most part of the histogram), are programmed
with a ‘0’. The cells whose resistance values lie in
between Threshold1 and Threshold2, are programmed
with ‘X’. The cells with the resistance values higher than
Threshold2 are programmed with a ‘1’.
The utilized ternary PUFs, exclude the unstable cells
programmed with a ‘X’ and do not used them in gen-
erating the secure keys’. Thereby, the binary output of
the generated ternary PUFs are more stable and reliable
compared to a conventional binary PUF. Figure 4 shows
the distribution of the 254 cells and the thresholds used
to divide the data into three states.
In the Registration phase, the readings of Ron for the
available 254 cells were mapped to ‘0’, ‘X’ or ‘1’. A
mask was used in order to extract 131 stable bits from
the available 254 cells. These stable PUF bits are initially
encrypted using a (255, 131) BCH encoder. Then, the
TABLE I: Comparison Of different fuzzy extractor schemes proposed in the literature.
Fuzzy Extractor Construction Key Length Helper Data bits Failure Probability Flipping probability
Reed Muller Generalized Multiple Concatenated coding [23] 128 13952 10−6 15%
BCH Repetition Code [24] 128 2052 10−9 13%
Generalized Concatenated (GC) Reed Muller [25] 2048 2048 5.37.10−10 14%
GC Reed Solomon [25] 1024 1024 3.47.10−10 14%
Polar Codes SC [10] 128 896 10−6 15%
HA SCL Polar Codes [10] 128 896 10−9 15%
Proposed Key Generation Scheme using SC decoder 250 262 10−8 15%
Proposed Key Generation Scheme using BP decoder 250 262 10−10 15%
Fig. 4: Distribution of 254 ReRAM cells and extraction
of stable 0’s and 1’s using Threshold1 and Threshold2
255 BCH encoded PUF data bits were encoded using a
(512, 255) Polar Encoder. At the output of the Polar
Encoder, the frozen bits (262 bits) were selected as
Helper Data while the unfrozen bits were hashed using
a “SHA-256” and stored in the server as the Secret Key.
During the key regeneration phase, the repeated data
measurements from 254 cells were used to generate a
noisy key by selecting unfrozen bits at the output of
a Polar encoder. The Helper Data (262 bits) that was
extracted during the key generation phase, was combined
with the noisy key and given to a Polar-BCH serial
decoder to generate an estimate of the initial 131 PUF
data bits. This estimate is used to regenerate the Key by
giving it to a serially concatenated BCH-Polar encoder
Fig. 5: Percentage error between Key generated from
Noisy or Attacker PUF and Key stored in the server
and selecting the unfrozen bits, which is then hashed and
compared against the Key stored in the server.
The proposed method was also tested using simulated
data in order to test the efficiency of the fuzzy extractor
to regenerate keys. A noisy version of the initial data
with a flipping probability of 15% was used to regenerate
the key. The fuzzy extractor could regenerate the key
exactly with a failure probability of 10−8 while using a
low complex Successive Cancellation decoder and 10−10
while using a iterative Belief Propagation decoder.
The percentage of error in regenerating the Key us-
ing Helper Data for original PUF data under different
simulated flipping probabilities was compared with an
Attacker PUF with an inter-Hamming distance ≥ 40%
and the results were plotted in Figure 6. The results
indicated that, if the flipping probability is ≤ 30%,
then the proposed key generation scheme can exactly
recover the Key using Helper Data. The attacker was not
successful in recovering the original PUF data by using
the publicly available Helper Data and the percentage of
error when the Attacker PUF is used to regenerate the
key was about 50%.
The performance of different Polar Decoders was tested
and plotted in Figure 6, which shows that the Belief
Propagation Decoder has a better performance compared
to the SC and SC List decoders. This increase in per-
formance comes with an increase in time complexity in
regenerating the key which is compared in Figure 7.
Table I shows the comparison between the failure proba-
bility of key regeneration using publicly available helper
data utilizing different fuzzy extractor schemes proposed
Fig. 6: BER of the Regenerated Key while using different
Polar Decoders
Fig. 7: Time complexity comparison of the Fuzzy ex-
tractor while using different Polar decoders.
in the literature. As seen in this table, our proposed
method results in a failure probability of 10−8 using
a low complex Successive Cancellation decoder for key
regeneration with a key length of 250 bits while using
262 bits of helper data, while the competitive methods
require a large number of helper bits to be able to
regenerate the keys with such a low probability of
mismatch. This failure probability was further reduced
to 10−10 when a complex Belief Propagation decoder
was utilized.
V. CONCLUSION
The ReRAM based PUFs are the most practical choice
for authentication and key generation in IoT, as they
operate at or below the systems’ noise level and therefore
are less vulnerable to side channel attacks compared to
the alternative memory technologies. However, the cur-
rent ReRAM-based PUFs present a high false negative
authentication rate since the behavior of these devices
can vary in different physical conditions that results in
a low probability of regenerating the same response in
different attempts. In this paper, we propose a secret key
generation scheme for ternary state PUFs that enables
reliable reconstruction of the desired secret keys utiliz-
ing a serially concatenated BCH-Polar fuzzy extractor.
The experimental results show that the proposed model
can offer a significantly lower probability of mismatch
between the original key and the regenerated ones, while
a less number of Helper data bits were used to extract
the Key when compared to previously proposed fuzzy
extractor techniques.
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